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NOTES
TWO TESTS UNITE TO RESOLVE THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Dora Georgescu*
The right of publicity is an established legal doctrine that grants
individuals the exclusive right to control the commercial use of their image.
Though it has many important and laudable uses, one unfortunate
consequence of the right of publicity is that it restricts artists’ abilities to
portray real persons in their works. In so doing, the right of publicity
directly conflicts with the First Amendment protections of an individual’s
freedom of expression.
While the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this tension in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court did not create a clear
standard for balancing the interests of each right. Without guidance from
the Supreme Court, lower courts have developed four tests for balancing
the right of publicity against the First Amendment: the relatedness test, the
predominant purpose test, the transformative use test, and the ad-hoc
balancing test.
Although most courts use only a single test to analyze the conflict
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the Sixth Circuit, in
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., relied on both the transformative use
test and the ad-hoc balancing test to form its analysis. This Note proposes
a test based on the Sixth Circuit approach, which creates a predictable
standard for balancing the First Amendment against the right of publicity.
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INTRODUCTION
Electronic Arts, Inc. has created a series of National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) football video games.1 One of the characters in these
games strongly resembles the college quarterback Ryan Hart.2 Because
Hart never consented to the use of his image in these games, he sued
Electronic Arts for violating his right of publicity.3 Electronic Arts
responded that the First Amendment shields it from right of publicity
claims.4 How should this dispute be resolved?
Determining the prevailing party hinges on how the court balances two
legal rights between which there is an “inherent tension”: the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.5 While the right of publicity grants
individuals6 the “exclusive right” to the commercial use of their image, the
First Amendment seeks to protect freedom of expression.7 Artists,
publishers, and other content makers routinely assert that the right of
publicity curtails their freedom of expression by restricting their ability to
use representations of real persons in their works.8 Thus, the right of
publicity has the potential to suppress creative works and therefore
undermine First Amendment goals.9
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this tension in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co.10 The Court’s holding, however, was tailored to
the unique facts of the case and therefore did not create a clear standard for
analyzing typical right of publicity cases. 11 With no clear guidance from
the Supreme Court, the lower courts have taken various approaches to
balancing the right of publicity against the First Amendment.12 Four
dominant tests have emerged: the relatedness test, the predominant purpose
test, the transformative use test, and the ad-hoc balancing test.13 Under the
relatedness test, a title that uses a celebrity’s name will be protected by the
1. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003); see also
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994).
6. Everyone has a right of publicity, however, celebrities are generally the plaintiffs in
right of publicity cases. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 217 (1954).
7. James Barr Haines, First Amendment II: Developments in the Right of Publicity,
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 226 (1990).
8. See Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in
Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 836 (1983).
9. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 146 (1993). This is problematic because states may
not impose laws that can impair the freedom of speech. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
10. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
11. See David Tan, Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First
Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 19 (2011).
12. Id. at 19–20.
13. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153–64 (3d Cir. 2013).
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First Amendment as long as it is not “wholly unrelated” to the contents of
the work. 14 Under the predominant purpose test, an unauthorized use of
another’s identity is protected if the purpose of the work is predominantly
expressive, but it is an infringement of the right of publicity if the purpose
of the work is predominantly commercial.15 Under the transformative use
test, a work that depicts a celebrity enjoys First Amendment protection if it
is the artist’s creative expression rather than merely an imitation of the
celebrity’s likeness.16 Finally, under the ad-hoc balancing test, courts
balance the consequences of restricting a defendant’s freedom of expression
against the justifications for a plaintiff’s right of publicity.17
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.,18 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity by relying
on both the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test.19 This
Note addresses the merits of the Sixth Circuit approach by examining the
transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test. While scholars have
addressed the transformative use test,20 no article carefully scrutinizes the
ad-hoc balancing test or the Sixth Circuit’s application of the transformative
use and ad-hoc balancing tests together. Thus, this Note fills the gap in the
scholarship in two significant ways. First, it examines the ad-hoc balancing
test on its own terms, addressing in particular the justifications for the right
of publicity. Second, it examines whether the Sixth Circuit approach
provides a predictable standard for resolving the tension between the right
of publicity and the First Amendment.
Part I outlines the development of the right of publicity and then
examines the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. Part II explains the Court’s reasoning in Zacchini and then
describes the four tests that have developed to balance the conflicting
interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Finally, Part III
examines the Sixth Circuit’s approach, which relies on two existing tests.
This Note concludes that a modified version of the Sixth Circuit’s approach
should be adopted, because it creates a clear and predictable standard for
resolving the tension between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity.
Without a predictable standard to balance the right of publicity against
the First Amendment, it is impossible to predict with certainty how courts

14. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
15. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
16. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–09 (Cal. 2001).
17. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th
Cir. 1996).
18. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
19. Id. at 936.
20. See generally Tan, supra note 11; F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge:
The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903
(2003).
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will decide a particular case.21 Art, mass media, books, and video games
routinely depict real people, so legal uncertainty chills a wide swath of
protected speech.22 Because free speech maintains “the integrity of the
political process that constitutes our system of self-government,”23 it is
imperative that the courts adopt a predictable standard to balance the right
of publicity against the First Amendment.
I. BUTTING HEADS: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Before analyzing the courts’ various approaches for rectifying the
conflict between the rights of publicity and free speech, it is necessary to
briefly provide some background and overview of each of these rights.
Part I.A defines the right of publicity and outlines its history, which began
in a separate legal doctrine, the right to privacy. Next, Part I.B explains the
First Amendment doctrines that intersect with the right of publicity,
including the distinction between commercial and expressive speech, and
the newsworthiness doctrine.
A. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity protects individuals from unauthorized commercial
use of their identity. 24 It originated in the right to privacy, which is a “right
to be let alone.”25 The right to privacy focuses on the victim’s mental
trauma when his or her privacy is breached.26 However, it does not offer
protection for famous individuals who have sought publicity.27 From the
right to privacy evolved the right of publicity, which protects celebrities
who want compensation for the use of their identity, regardless of whether
this use has caused them mental distress.28 This section outlines that
evolution.

21. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of
Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 (1979).
22. Id. at 1594. The chilling effect of legal uncertainty is “a very real threat.” Id. at 1595.
23. Id. at 1597. Because celebrities are “widely recognized cultural sign[s],” expressive
use of a celebrity’s image qualifies for “the highest level of First Amendment protection as
political speech.” Tan, supra note 11, at 4–5; see also infra Part I.B.1 (explaining how
artistic depictions of celebrities advance First Amendment goals).
24. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed.
2013); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (stating that the
right of publicity prohibits others from appropriating “the commercial value of a person’s
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade”).
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.7.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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1. The Proposal and Debate of a Right to Privacy
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published “The Right
to Privacy,”29 in which they argued that the press had overstepped its
boundaries and intruded into individual privacy.30 They denounced an
industry that, through public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,
subjected others “to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”31 Drawing on Justice Thomas Cooley’s
recognition that everyone has the “right to be let alone,”32 Warren and
Brandeis urged the courts to create a remedy for those whose privacy had
been violated and to include a “right to privacy” in the common law.33
New York rejected the common law adoption of a right to privacy in a
1902 decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.34 The court
rejected the theme set forth by Warren and Brandeis, concluding that the
right to privacy could not be “incorporated without doing violence to settled
principles of law by which the [press] and the public have long been
guided,” such as the freedom of speech.35 Noting the precedential effects
of its holding, the court observed that it could not invoke a legal doctrine
that had not yet been established.36 Instead, the legislature would be better
suited to “interfere and arbitrarily provide” a statute to prevent the
unpermitted use of one’s likeness for advertisement.37
Three years after Roberson, the Georgia Supreme Court took the opposite
approach in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,38 and embraced
Warren and Brandeis’ proposed right to privacy. 39 The court found that
the right to privacy is an absolute right along with the rights of personal
security and personal liberty,40 and adopted Warren and Brandeis’
definition of the right to privacy as a right “to be secure from invasion by
29. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1891).
30. Id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency.”). During Warren and Brandeis’s time, the press was known for
prying into the private lives of many people. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.13. With
over sixty newspaper articles written about Warren and his family, scholars have
hypothesized that this law review article was a direct response to the press’s interference
with his life. Id.
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 196.
32. Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1990).
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 198.
34. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). In this case, the defendants circulated about 25,000
photographs of the plaintiff despite knowing that they did not have the authority to do so. Id.
at 442.
35. Id. at 447.
36. See id. at 444.
37. Id. at 443. The legislature followed the court’s suggestion; the New York statute is
codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1995).
38. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
39. Justice Cobb denounced the court’s decision in Roberson as “the result of an
unconscious yielding to the feeling of conservatism which naturally arises in the mind of a
judge who faces a proposition which is novel.” Id. at 78.
40. Id. at 70.
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the public into matters of a private nature.”41 While the Pavesich court
recognized, as did the court in Roberson, that the right to privacy conflicted
with the constitutional rights of free speech and the freedom of press, it
trusted in the “wisdom and integrity of the judiciary” to strike the proper
balance between these conflicting rights.42
After the Roberson and Pavesich decisions, states were divided; some
favored Roberson, while others accepted Pavesich.43 However, by the
1940s, most states had recognized the right to privacy.44
In 1960, William Prosser45 divided the tort of invasion of privacy into
four separate categories: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and
(4) appropriation.46 These four categories are distinct kinds of invasions
and represent distinct interests of the plaintiff. The first kind of invasion is
defined as the “physical intrusion” into a plaintiff’s private life.47 This sort
of invasion includes activities such as the physical harassment of
overzealous paparazzi, “peeping toms,” and police officers searching a
home without a warrant.48 The second kind of invasion is the “public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts.”49 The disclosed information must
be “embarrassing” from the viewpoint of a person “of ordinary
sensibilities.”50 The third category that Professor Prosser identified is very
closely related to the law of defamation. This “false light” invasion of
privacy requires “injury to human dignity” as a result of the public
presentation of a plaintiff in a false light.51 The final category of invasion
of privacy involves the unpermitted use of a plaintiff’s identity “with
damage to plaintiff’s dignitary interests and peace of mind.”52 This
category was the precursor to the right of publicity.53
2. The Evolution of the Right of Publicity
Privacy law developed with a focus upon the “mental trauma incurred
when one’s identity [is] widely disseminated in an unpermitted commercial
use.”54 This conception became problematic when famous plaintiffs began
to appear in court.55 These plaintiffs were not concerned with the
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id.
43. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.18.
44. Id.
45. Regarded as “a great Master of Torts,” William Prosser wrote numerous highly
influential and authoritative works on torts. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook:
Classroom As Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579.
46. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.20.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 1.21.
50. Id. The right to privacy is not intended to protect those who are “abnormally
sensitive about . . . publicity.” Id.
51. Id. § 1.22.
52. Id. § 1.23.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1.7.
55. Id.
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dissemination of their identity, but rather they wanted to “control when,
where and how their identity was so used.”56 Because privacy rights had
come to mean the “right to be left alone,” courts struggled with the claims
for invasion of privacy of plaintiffs that had built their careers in order to
gain publicity.57 As a result, courts limited celebrities’ ability to recover
under right to privacy claims,58 and celebrities could not protect their
economic interests under the right to privacy.59
A Fifth Circuit case from 1941 illustrates this problem. In O’Brien v.
Pabst Sales Co.,60 professional football player David O’Brien sued Pabst
Beer Company for using his photograph in its “Pabst Blue Ribbon” beer
advertising calendar.61 The district court dismissed O’Brien’s invasion of
privacy case. 62 The court of appeals agreed with the district judge’s
opinion that the association of O’Brien with a glass of beer “could not
possibly disgrace [him] . . . or cause him damage.”63 Furthermore, because
O’Brien was not a “private person,” the court reasoned that he could not be
harmed by publicity because he had already been seeking and receiving the
publicity imparted by Pabst Beer Company.64
The dissent characterized O’Brien’s claim as one for a “right of
property,” which belongs to everyone.65 Noting that the majority left
celebrities without remedy for nonlibelous use of their image, the dissent
focused instead upon O’Brien’s commercial value.66 Judge Edwin Holmes
observed that commercial advertisers may take advantage of the publicity
that celebrities have gained through their “talent and accomplishment” in
order to “increase their sales,” without compensating the celebrities from
whose name they profited.67
The O’Brien dissent’s focus on property rights in the context of privacy
rights was a step in advancing the right of publicity, but it wasn’t until 1953
that these two concepts were explicitly linked. In Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,68 the Second Circuit first used the term
“right of publicity” and explained it as a property right in a person’s
identity:

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (denying
damages); Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 28 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813–14 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (awarding nominal damages of six cents).
59. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 203–13. Scholars have noted that the economic focus of
the right of publicity makes it a “more practical” right than the right to privacy. See, e.g.,
Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A “Haystack in a Hurricane,” 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977,
988 (1982).
60. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
61. Id. at 168.
62. Id. at 169.
63. Id. at 169–70.
64. Id. at 170.
65. Id. at 170–71 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 171.
67. Id.
68. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made “in gross,” i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or
of anything else . . . .
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of
their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and subways.69

Shortly after Haelan, Professor Melville Nimmer, an authority on free
speech and intellectual property, wrote an article echoing the Haelan court,
which established the right of publicity as a viable legal doctrine.70
Nimmer noted that the doctrine developed by Brandeis and Warren, while
sufficient “to protect the sensibilities of nineteenth century Brahmin
Boston, is not adequate to meet the demands of the second half of the
twentieth century, particularly with respect to the advertising, motion
picture, television, and radio industries.”71 He reasoned that the celebrities
working in these industries “do not seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ which
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect.”72 Instead, celebrities wish to
protect the use of their name and likeness, which have economic value.73
Because this value could not be protected under a privacy theory, the newly
recognized right of publicity was a more adequate legal doctrine for
commercial misappropriation of one’s likeness. 74
3. The Right of Publicity Today
Today, the right of publicity is an established legal doctrine.75 It is an
intellectual property right created by state law, 76 and infringement of the
right of publicity can result in liability for the commercial tort of unfair
competition.77 While it is a distinct legal category, the right of publicity
shares elements of both property and tort law.78

69. Id. at 868.
70. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.27.
71. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 203.
72. Id. at 203–04.
73. Id. at 204.
74. Id.
75. See Kwall, supra note 5, at 52.
76. Although the right of publicity is created by state law, its intersection with the First
Amendment presents a federal issue. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
562, 568 (1977).
77. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 1.3.
78. Id. § 1.7. The right of publicity is categorized as the commercial tort of unfair
competition and as a form of property, specifically a form of intellectual property. Id.
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Almost every state has recognized the right of publicity either by statute
or at common law.79 Nineteen states have codified the right of publicity in
statutes.80 Additionally, the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition
recognizes the right of publicity.81 A prima facie right of publicity claim
requires three basic elements: (1) ownership of an enforceable right in the
identity of a human being; (2) use by another, without permission, of some
aspect of the plaintiff’s identity in such a way that it is identifiable from the
unauthorized use; and (3) likelihood that the defendant’s use will cause
economic injury to the value of that identity.82
Despite the widespread adoption of the right of publicity, it is no clearer
than it was three decades ago, when Professor Ausness characterized it as a
“haystack in a hurricane.”83 To begin with, courts have not come up with a
consistent test to determine what the right of publicity covers.84 While
some courts have suggested that almost any recognizable characteristic is
protected, other decisions have narrowed the right of publicity.85 Similarly,
while some statutes are “drawn too narrowly” to protect only celebrities’
names, portraits, or pictures,86 “broadly drawn” statutes extend protection
to include additional traits such as voice, likeness, and personality.87 Yet,
perhaps the most troubling uncertainty about the right of publicity comes
from its interaction with the First Amendment.
B. Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity
This section explains the competing interests of the First Amendment and
the right of publicity. In addressing the conflict between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, courts begin their analysis by
determining whether the use of a person’s likeness is “expressive” or
“commercial.”88 Thus, Part I.B.2 describes the types of expressive speech
79. Id. § 6.1. California, Florida, and Wisconsin recognize the right of publicity through
both statute and common law. See Christopher Pesce, The Likeness Monster: Should the
Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 794 (1990).
80. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 6.8. Seven states recognize a statutory right of
publicity. Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin recognize a common law right of publicity. Id. §§ 6.1–.127. Indiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Washington have statutes protecting the right to privacy, which also embody
the right of publicity. Id.
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
82. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 3.2.
83. Ausness, supra note 59, at 978.
84. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1590.
85. Compare Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1962) (granting relief
for plaintiff’s distinctive speaking style), with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435
F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970) (denying relief for imitation of singing style).
86. Haines, supra note 7, at 216.
87. Id. at 219.
88. See Tan, supra note 11, at 16; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,
373 (Mo. 2003) (noting that expressive works, such as those in Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001), Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969–70 (10th Cir. 1996), and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994,
1003–05 (2d Cir. 1989), are fully protected, while commercial works, such as those in
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that receive First Amendment protection and distinguishes protected
expressive speech from less protected commercial speech. To illustrate this
rather elusive distinction, Part I.B.3 outlines two cases where courts found
works that contained commercial elements to be expressive enough to
outweigh the right to privacy.89 Finally, Part I.B.4 briefly describes the
types of speech that are exempt from right of publicity claims under the
newsworthiness doctrine.
1. Irreconcilable Goals of the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity
The First Amendment “protects the dissemination of ideas and
The right of publicity significantly constrains the
information.”90
“dissemination of ideas and information” by limiting who can use celebrity
images.91 In fact, it appears that the right of publicity “has been defined as
if it existed in isolation from the First Amendment.”92 As a result, there is
“an inherent tension” between the right of publicity and First Amendment
rights.93
To understand the conflict between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity, it is helpful to understand two important goals of the First
Amendment.94 First, it serves “‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas’ and to repel efforts to limit the ‘uninhibited, robust and wide-open’
debate on public issues.”95 Because celebrities take on public meaning,96
the use of their likeness may be important for an uninhibited debate about
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001), White v. Samsung
Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992), and Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460, 462–64 (9th Cir. 1988), are rarely protected).
89. Although these cases address the right to privacy, they were brought under N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1995), which encompasses both the right to privacy and
the right of publicity. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
90. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1026. The First Amendment provides that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1590.
92. Id. at 1590. This may be explained by the fact that the right to privacy was
articulated decades before free speech took a central role in American jurisprudence. Id. at
1596 n.92.
93. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Martin
Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697,
708 (Ga. 1982) (Weltner, J., concurring) (noting that the right of publicity has “created an
open-ended and ill-defined force which jeopardizes a right of unquestioned authenticity-free
speech.”).
94. Professor Emerson explains that freedom of expression is justified on four grounds:
(1) to assure “individual self-fulfillment,” (2) to advance truth and knowledge, (3) to secure
society’s participation in social and political decision making, and (4) to balance social
stability and change. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963).
95. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979) (citing Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388 (1969)).
96. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802–03 (Cal. 2001).
Stars embody “the social categories in which people are placed and through which they have
to make sense of their lives . . . categories of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual
orientation, and so on.” Stuart Hall, Introduction: Who Needs “Identity?,” in QUESTIONS OF
CULTURAL IDENTITY 1, 5 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds., 1996).
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cultural values. 97 Second, the First Amendment assures “individual selffulfillment” by allowing individuals to express their views.98 Creative use
of celebrity images can serve as an “important avenue of individual
expression.”99 By allowing celebrities to control how, and by whom, their
images are used, the right of publicity has the potential to undermine these
First Amendment goals. 100
2. Distinguishing Expressive Speech from Commercial Speech
Courts faced with the competing interests of the right of publicity and the
First Amendment begin their analysis by determining whether the speech in
question is “expressive” or “commercial.”101 Expressive speech and
commercial speech are entitled to varying degrees of First Amendment
protection, which in turn affects how each type of speech is treated in the
right of publicity context.102
Expressive speech is speech that conveys an idea or message. 103 This
includes the spoken and written word, 104 visual art,105 video games,106
Informative speech and
movies, music, and live entertainment.107
entertaining expressive speech are equally protected. 108 Conduct is also
considered speech if it is intended to convey a specific message and if it is

97. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 802–03.
98. Emerson, supra note 94, at 878–79.
99. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 803.
100. Id.
101. See Tan, supra note 11, at 16; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363,
373 (Mo. 2003).
102. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 373.
103. George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and the Artist—Part I,
R.I. B.J., 7, 9 (1996). This need not be a “narrow, succinctly articulable message.” Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (2011).
104. Vetter & Roche, supra note 103, at 8.
105. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Visual art is as wide
ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or
other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection . . . . One cannot
look at Winslow Homer’s paintings on the Civil War without seeing, in his depictions of the
boredom and hardship of the individual soldier, expressions of anti-war sentiments, the idea
that war is not heroic.”). Although art is protected because it has “intrinsic value,” courts
often look to the political value of the art as well. Tan, supra note 11, at 15. Therefore,
artwork generally must make political or social commentary in order to be granted First
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp 644, 653 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (holding that installations satirizing the mayor of Chicago and his wife constituted
protected speech); see also Vetter & Roche, supra note 103, at 9. But see Close v. Lederle,
424 F.2d 988, 990–91 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the nudity and sexual references in
defendant’s work did not constitute political or social speech and could therefore be removed
from display in a university corridor).
106. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)).
107. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
108. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979) (noting that
the “line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to warrant a distinction
in the protection that each type of speech receives (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
509, 510 (1948))).
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likely that others would understand the message conveyed. 109 In a right of
publicity case, if the speech at issue is expressive, the court will likely find
that the interest in free speech outweighs the right of publicity interest.110
Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.”111 Critics note that the distinction
between expressive and commercial speech makes little sense in the modern
“commercial culture,” where commercial speech often contains expressive
elements.112 Nonetheless, commercial speech generally receives lesser
First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech113 because it has a
“high potential for consumer deception and unjust enrichment.”114
Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment only if it is not
misleading and concerns “lawful activity.”115 The government can
constitutionally restrict commercial speech when the restriction is justified
by a substantial state interest and when the restriction is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.116 In situations where commercial and noncommercial
speech is “inextricably intertwined,” the speech is analyzed under the
standard of review used for noncommercial speech.117 Commercial speech
is often at issue in right of publicity cases, 118 and generally the right of
publicity will outweigh the First Amendment where speech is
commercial. 119

109. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag
was a form of communication and therefore was “speech” protected by the First
Amendment).
110. Tan, supra note 11, at 21; see also infra Part I.B.2.
111. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
Such speech “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). However, not all works sold for profit are considered commercial speech. See
Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017–18 (Civ. Ct. 1993).
112. David L. Hudson, Jr., Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech
§ 6.9 (2012); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“In our pop culture, where salesmanship must be
entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line between the commercial and
noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared.”).
113. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Although the Supreme Court initially considered
that commercial speech did not deserve any protection, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52, 55 (1942), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The Court has
since recognized the value of commercial speech. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 420 (1993).
114. Kwall, supra note 5, at 52.
115. Id. at 75 n.127.
116. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565–66.
117. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see
also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
any commercial aspect of the defendant’s product was “inextricably entwined” with
expression and, therefore, was fully protected).
118. Tan, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that many right of publicity claims involve the
unauthorized use of a celebrity in advertisements).
119. Id. at 21–22; see, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2001); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–64 (9th Cir. 1988).
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3. How the Distinction Between Expressive and Commercial Speech
Impacts the Right of Publicity Analysis
The following two cases illustrate how the distinction between expressive
and commercial speech affects the right of publicity analysis. Both cases
were brought under New York’s right to privacy statute.120 Although a
right to privacy statute, it is sufficiently broad to encompass the right of
publicity as well.121 New York’s privacy statutes prohibit the unauthorized
use of another’s image for advertising and trade purposes.122 This
limitation enables courts to balance First Amendment interests against
government interests in restricting commercial speech.123 However, this
limitation does not prohibit all profitable use of another’s image. In
Simeonov v. Tiegs,124 the court held that an artist could sell “at least a
limited number of copies” of artwork that includes another’s likeness,
without violating New York privacy law.125
In Hoepker v. Kruger,126 plaintiff Thomas Hoepker, a German
photographer, created a photographic image of plaintiff Charlotte Dabney in
1960.127 Thirty years later, defendant Barbara Kruger created a collage of
photographs that incorporated Hoepker’s 1960 piece of Charlotte
Dabney.128 Krueger than sold this collage to the Museum of Contemporary
Art Los Angeles.129 Hoepker and Dabney filed suit in the Southern District
of New York, alleging violation of Dabney’s right to privacy. 130
Dabney’s claim satisfied three out of four elements for a right to privacy
claim in New York: (1) her image had been used, (2) without her consent,
(3) in New York State.131 Therefore, the court set out to determine whether
the fourth element, that this use was “for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade,” had been satisfied. 132 The court found that “advertising
that is undertaken in connection with a use protected by the First
Amendment falls outside the statute’s reach.”133 Thus, because the Kruger

120. New York has codified the right to privacy. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 1995).
121. Pesce, supra note 79, at 782. By passing these statutes, the legislature sought to
“protect against the commercial appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Foster v.
Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013).
122. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51; see also Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d
340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
123. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (noting that “[t]he advertising and trade limitation in
New York’s privacy statutes was crafted with the First Amendment in mind.”).
124. 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Civ. Ct. 1993).
125. Id. at 1018.
126. 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
127. Id. at 342.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 344.
131. Id. at 348.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 350.
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composite was protected artistic expression, it outweighed Dabney’s right
to privacy.134
The New York Supreme Court reached the same conclusion years later in
Foster v. Svenson.135 During the course of a year, photographer Arne
Svenson photographed strangers inside their apartments.136 He displayed
these photographs, titled “The Neighbors,” in an exhibit at a New York
gallery. 137 Svenson did not have consent to photograph any of the people
portrayed in “The Neighbors” or to display the photographs.138
Plaintiffs, the parents of two young children who had appeared in
Svenson’s photographs, filed suit pursuant to New York Civil Rights Law
sections 50 to 51.139 One of the photographs portrayed a “clearly
identifiable” image of one child’s face.140 The plaintiffs claimed that these
photographs had exposed the location of their apartment, which
compromised “the security and safety of the[ir] children.”141
The court noted that an artistic work that uses another’s image is not
simply “advertising or trade,” but is protected speech, which may be sold as
part of “the right to disseminate the ‘speech.’”142 Thus, the court rejected
the plaintiffs’ contention that because Svenson had used the photos in the
media to promote his exhibition and had offered these works for sale, his
actions constituted “advertising and trade” under New York Civil Rights
Law sections 50 to 51.143 The court concluded that Svenson’s photographs
served “more than just an advertising or trade purpose because they
promote the enjoyment of art in the form of a displayed exhibition.”144
Noting that “it makes Plaintiffs cringe to think their private lives and
images of their small children can find their way into the public forum of an
art exhibition,” the court nonetheless concluded that the “value of artistic
expression” of Svenson’s photographs outweighed any commercial value
“that stem[ed] from the published photos”. 145 Thus, the court held in favor
134. Id. However, the court noted that First Amendment rights do not completely negate
privacy rights. Id. at 348.
135. No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013).
136. Id.
137. See Dan Arnheim, Right to Privacy v. Freedom of Expression in Case of “Peeping
Tom” Photographer, CTR. FOR ART LAW (July 21, 2013), http://itsartlaw.com/2013/07/21/
right-to-privacy-v-freedom-of-expression-in-case-of-peeping-tom-photographer/.
138. Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1. In fact, Svenson admitted: “The Neighbors don’t
know they are being photographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my home into
theirs.” Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. In their complaint, plaintiffs stated that they were “greatly frightened and
angered by defendant’s utter disregard for their privacy and the privacy of their
children . . . [and] now fear that they must keep their shades drawn at all hours of the day in
order to avoid telephoto photography by a neighbor.” Adam Klasfeld, Parents Blast
Photographer for Telephoto Shots, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (May 24, 2013, 9:15 AM),
https://www.courthousenews.com/2013/05/24/57929.htm.
142. Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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of Svenson, finding that the right to privacy yields to the First
Amendment.146
In Hoepker and Foster, each court found that the First Amendment
interests outweighed the right to privacy interests only after determining
that the speech at hand was expressive rather than commercial.147 Such a
determination is unnecessary in cases where the speech is part of news
coverage, and therefore automatically shielded from right of publicity
claims. The following section addresses this category of protected speech.
4. The Newsworthiness Doctrine:
Speech Shielded from Right of Publicity Claims
Under the newsworthiness doctrine, the media may use the unauthorized
image of celebrities in its “everyday news coverage.”148 “News coverage”
has been construed broadly to include “virtually all types of information
and entertainment communicated by the media.”149 Courts read the
newsworthiness doctrine broadly because they believe “it is not the place of
courts to determine which issues may or may not interest the general
public.”150 Over half of the states that have right of publicity statutes
include an express media exception.151
While the newsworthiness doctrine gives the media broad leeway in
using celebrities’ images,152 non-media defendants are generally not
exempt from liability for the unauthorized use of celebrity identities even if
Additionally, the
this use has some “newsworthy content.”153
newsworthiness doctrine has two significant limitations for media
defendants. First, the newsworthiness doctrine does not protect publishers
who use another’s identity only to “draw attention to an unrelated
article.”154 Second, where news coverage “destroys the total economic
146. Id. This decision likely shocked many, because Svenson’s work was greeted with
outrage by many New Yorkers. See David Walker, Judge Dismisses Privacy Lawsuit Against
“Voyeur” Artist Arne Svenson, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.pdnonline.com/news/Judge-Dismisses-Priv-8708.shtml.
147. See supra notes 132, 143 and accompanying text.
148. Patrick Whitman, Everyone’s a Critic: Tiger Woods, the Right of Publicity and the
Artist, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 41, 57 (2001). The doctrine is not limited to current events
but rather also applies to any story that is “accurate and deals with a matter of public
interest.” Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030.
149. Tan, supra note 11, at 22. Thus, parodies and satires are protected. See J. Thomas
McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The Human Persona as
Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 131
(1995).
150. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030.
151. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 6.18.
152. See Ausness, supra note 59, at 1030; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that
there is a “strong presumption in favor of the media,” and a “media defendant who invokes
the newsworthiness exception often escapes liability”).
153. See Tan, supra note 11, at 22–23.
154. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1031; Whitman, supra note 144, at 60; see also Grant v.
Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp 876, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding a violation of the plaintiff’s
right of publicity because the use of the plaintiff’s picture was unrelated to the content of
defendant’s article).
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viability of a performer’s act,” the court limits its protection of the
media.155
II. THE COURTS TRY TO RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This part explains the current approaches that the courts use to reconcile
free speech and the right of publicity. Part II.A explains the only Supreme
Court case to address the conflict, Zacchini v. Howard-Scripps
Broadcasting Co.156 Part II.B explores the four approaches that courts have
developed in response to the Supreme Court’s unclear holding of how the
conflicting interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment
should be balanced. The Sixth and Second Circuits have adopted the
relatedness test, which looks to the relationship between the use of a
celebrity’s likeness and the work as a whole.157 The Missouri Supreme
Court has adopted the predominant purpose test under which works that are
predominantly commercial violate the right of publicity, while works that
are predominantly expressive do not.158 The Third Circuit and the
California Supreme Court have adopted the transformative use test, which
asks whether a work depicting a celebrity is artistic expression rather than a
literal depiction of the celebrity. 159 Finally, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
use an ad-hoc balancing test that weighs the policy justifications for the
right of publicity against the content creator’s First Amendment interests.160
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the Sixth Circuit used two tests—
the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test—to decide a case
that involved a clash between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment.161 Part II.C summarizes this approach, and then Part III
evaluates it in greater detail.
A. The Supreme Court Creates an Unclear Standard
The Supreme Court has addressed the conflicting interests of the First
Amendment and the right of publicity only once, in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co.162 Zacchini was an entertainer who performed a
“human cannonball” act in which he was shot out of a cannon at the Geauga

155. Whitman, supra note 148, at 57.
156. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
157. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
158. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
159. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Winter v. DC Comics,
69 P.3d 473, 475 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
807 (Cal. 2001); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Ct.
App. 2011).
160. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,
95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
161. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003).
162. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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County Fair in Burton, Ohio.163 On August 31, 1972, a reporter for
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. videotaped Zacchini’s entire act, which
lasted approximately fifteen seconds, and aired the clip on a news
program. 164 Zacchini brought a suit in Ohio State court, claiming that
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. unlawfully appropriated his professional
property when it publicized his act without his consent.165 On certiorari,
the U.S. Supreme Court sought to answer whether First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights permitted Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. to infringe
upon Zacchini’s right of publicity.166
1. The Majority Opinion in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
The Court held that the First Amendment did not permit the station to
broadcast the entire performance.167 The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled
that Scripps-Howard was “constitutionally privileged to include in its
newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by
the right of publicity.”168 The court had relied heavily on Time, Inc. v.
Hill169 to reach this conclusion.170
The Supreme Court distinguished the case before it from Time, Inc. on
two grounds. First, the Court explained that in Time, Inc. the Court had
addressed a “false light” case rather than a case involving “appropriation”
of another’s identity for commercial purposes.171 Thus, Time, Inc. did not
involve the rights of a performer whose name had a commercial value.172
Second, the Court distinguished the State’s interests in allowing a cause of
action in each case. 173 The State’s interests in Time, Inc. was to protect the
plaintiff’s reputation. 174 The State’s interest in permitting a right of
publicity is in “the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors.”175
Therefore, Scripps-Howard was not privileged to broadcast Zacchini’s
entire performance, because this posed “a substantial threat to the economic
value of [his] performance.”176 Zacchini earned a living through his
163. Id. at 563. To watch this extraordinary feat, see Ray Zate, Zacchini: Human
Cannonball (Official Trailer), YOUTUBE (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=HSizGn8vbFQ.
164. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64.
165. Id. at 564.
166. Id. at 565–66.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 569.
169. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
170. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570–71. Time, Inc. held that the media has the privilege to
report matters of public interest, even if such reporting infringes upon privacy rights of those
portrayed. See Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 388.
171. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
172. See id. at 574 (noting that Time, Inc. did not involve the broadcast of a performer’s
entire act for which he normally gets paid).
173. See id. at 573.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 575.
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performance, and the broadcast of the entire performance for free dissuaded
the public from going to the fair and paying to see the performance.177
Thus, if Scripps-Howard broadcasted his entire performance, it was
required to recognize Zacchini’s “commercial stake in his act,” and pay
him. 178
Recognizing that individuals have an “economic incentive . . . to produce
a performance of interest to the public,” the Court considered that
protecting performers’ economic rights would increase the level of
entertainment available to the public, and thereby advance First
Amendment goals.179
2. The Dissenting Opinion in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented
primarily because they were concerned with the majority’s focus on the
broadcast of the “entire act.”180 Justice Powell noted that the majority’s
“repeated incantation of a single formula: ‘a performer’s act’” did not
provide a clear standard.181 Moreover, Justice Powell considered the
majority’s opinion insensitive to First Amendment interests, noting that the
broadcast by Scripps-Howard was a “routine example of the press’
fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system.”182 He explained
that the majority’s holding could lead to “media self-censorship;” unsure of
what portrays an “entire act,” broadcasting stations may decline to cover
even “clearly newsworthy events.”183 In this case, the public is deprived of
the values that the First Amendment fosters.184
The dissent proposed a different analytical framework from the one
employed by the majority.185 Rather than looking to whether Zacchini’s
entire act had been broadcasted, the question should be how ScrippsHoward had used the film footage. 186 Under this framework, a news
broadcast is protected unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the news
broadcast was a “subterfuge or cover for private or commercial
exploitation.”187 Because a plaintiff like Zacchini had made himself public
through his performance, it would be inconsistent with the principles of the
First Amendment for him to recover for “routine” news coverage.188
177. Id. at 575–76.
178. Id. at 578.
179. Id. at 575–76; see also Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035.
180. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 580–81 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Samuelson, supra
note 8, at 854.
181. Zacchini, 433 U.S at 580–81; see also Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035 (noting that
the “entire act” standard does not provide guidance about the extent to which the First
Amendment protects against the appropriation of something less than an entire act).
182. Zacchini, 433 U.S at 579–80.
183. Id. at 580–81.
184. Id. at 581.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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While this “routine news” test has been less criticized than the majority
opinion, it too creates uncertainty.189 Distinguishing between routine news
and commercial entertainment, as Justice Powell proposed, is difficult
because many news shows have both commercial and entertainment
components.190
3. What Did Zacchini Establish?
Zacchini demonstrates that the right of publicity can outweigh First
Amendment interests.191 However, the majority focused on the narrow
situation of when a television company has broadcasted a performer’s entire
act, rather than on the broader question of when the use of one’s name or
likeness violates his publicity rights.192 Thus, no general rule can be clearly
derived from Zacchini to resolve the conflict between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity.193
Unpredictability has always been considered especially detrimental when
free speech is at issue.194 Many exercises of the First Amendment include
portrayals of celebrities as part of movies, television shows, and plays.195
However, the threat of liability due to a finding that such works have
infringed on a celebrity’s right of publicity may deter production of such
works.196 This is especially true if those who have produced the works do
not have insurance against sanctions because “of the uncertainty of the
prevailing legal rules.”197
Additionally, overprotecting the right of publicity may create “a
monopoly over the raw material of creative expression.”198 On the other
hand, under-protecting the right of publicity may reduce incentives for
celebrities to engage in creative endeavors.199
Since Zacchini, the Supreme Court has denied numerous writs of
certiorari asking the Court to create a uniform standard for balancing the
right of publicity against the First Amendment.200 Without guidance from

189. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035; see also Haines, supra note 7, at 229.
190. Ausness, supra note 59, at 1035.
191. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).
192. Volokh, supra note 20, at 906.
193. See McCarthy, supra note 24, § 8.27; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that
Zacchini is of “limited precedential value”).
194. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1594 (“First Amendment rights require
‘breathing space,’ and uncertainty about the legal standards that control these rights is
regarded as having a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.”).
195. Id. at 1595.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996).
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 1090 (2008); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078
(2002); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885 (10th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 873 (2000).

2014]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLICITY

927

the Supreme Court, the lower courts have created various tests for
addressing the tension between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity.
B. Four Tests Emerge in Response to Zacchini
In line with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 201 many courts
facing a conflict between the First Amendment and publicity rights interpret
the right of publicity narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional question
regarding the First Amendment.202 However, the conflict cannot always be
avoided. Therefore, the lower courts have created four tests in an attempt to
strike a balance between the competing interests in right of publicity cases:
the relatedness test, the predominant purpose test, the transformative use
test, and the ad-hoc balancing test.203 This section describes all four tests;
however, particular emphasis is placed on the transformative use test and
the ad-hoc balancing test because these shape the test proposed in Part III of
this Note.
1. The Relatedness Test
The relatedness test, which originated in Rogers v. Grimaldi,204 asks
whether the use of the celebrity’s likeness is related to the work as a
whole.205 In Rogers, the appellees produced a film entitled “Ginger and
Fred.”206 The film portrayed two fictional Italian cabaret performers who
had built a career in Italy by imitating the famous Hollywood duo, Ginger
Rogers and Fred Astaire. 207 Rogers alleged that the defendant’s use of her
first name in the title of the film confused consumers, in violation of the
Lanham Act,208 and violated her common law right of publicity.209
The Second Circuit used the same test to address the Lanham Act claim
and the right of publicity claim.210 Although the right of publicity is
broader than the Lanham Act, 211 both laws serve similar interests. While
the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s
201. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1979).
202. McCarthy, supra note 24, § 8.36; see also Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430,
433 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a statute which prohibited the use of a person’s name
without their consent should be construed to avoid any constitutional issues); Simeonov v.
Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (Civ. Ct. 1993) (“If a Court can avoid declaring a provision
of law unconstitutional, it must do so.”).
203. “[C]ourts have gradually constructed” a “careful balance . . . between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.” Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619,
626 (6th Cir. 2000).
204. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
205. See id. at 1004–05.
206. Id. at 996.
207. Id. at 997.
208. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). The Lanham Act
protects the public from commercial deception. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992).
209. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
210. Id. at 999–1002.
211. Id. at 1004.
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image,212 the Lanham Act protects against the use of a celebrity’s image in
a way that falsely implies the celebrity’s endorsement of a certain
product.213 Therefore, courts have observed that the “Lanham Act is the
federal equivalent of a right of publicity claim.”214
The Second Circuit rejected Rogers’s argument that the First Amendment
only protects the author if he has no alternative means to express his
idea.215 Noting that the Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner “alternative avenues of
communication” test216 had been applied in trademark cases,217 the panel
rejected this test because it “does not sufficiently accommodate the public’s
interest in free expression.”218
Instead, the court looked to three cases that had addressed the use of a
celebrity’s name in a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie title.219
Based on these cases, the court held that because the movie title “Ginger
and Fred” was related to the contents of the movie (the main characters
were in fact known as Ginger and Fred in Italy) and was not “a disguised

212. See MCCARTHY supra note 24, § 1.3.
213. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1400 (9th Cir.
1992).
214. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2006); see also ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003).
215. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998–99. This argument was based on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
where the Supreme Court determined whether a privately owned shopping center could
prohibit others from distributing handbills, which were unrelated to the center’s business, on
its property. 407 U.S. 551, 552 (1972). The Court noted that the respondents had alternative
methods of delivering their handbills, outside of the shopping complex. Id. at 566–67. Thus,
the Court concluded: “It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate
alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish
property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.” Id. at 567.
216. See Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 567.
217. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402–03 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that because defendants could convey their message without infringing the
plaintiff’s trademark, in other words, there existed an “adequate alternative avenue[] of
communication,” and they were not protected under the First Amendment); see also Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)
(same).
218. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. The court addressed the Lloyd test in its analysis of
Rogers’s trademark infringement claim; however, the argument that it does not
accommodate the public’s interest in free expression was applied to the right of publicity in
Cardtoons, L.C. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996). See also infra
notes 309–10 and accompanying text.
219. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. In Hicks v. Casablanca Records, the court found no right
of publicity claim where it was obvious to the public that an event depicted in a movie was
fictional. 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., New
York’s appellate division said that the right of publicity did not prohibit the use of a
celebrity’s name in a title as long as the work was not “simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980).
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, Justice Newmann noted that free expression
would be significantly reduced if authors could not write fictional stories depicting
prominent individuals, and thus concluded that the use of a celebrity’s name would not
infringe on the celebrity’s right of publicity as long as the use was not “wholly unrelated” to
the celebrity. 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring).
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advertisement” for the sale of a product or service, it did not violate the
Oregon common law right of publicity.220
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Rogers approach in Parks v. LaFace
Records.221 In Parks, Rosa Parks, an international symbol of the civil
rights movement, 222 sued record producers LaFace Records and the rap duo
OutKast, alleging that the musicians had violated her right of publicity with
their hit single song titled “Rosa Parks.”223
Noting that the Third Restatement of the Unfair Competition supports the
Rogers formulation,224 the court applied Rogers to determine “the artistic
relevance of the title, Rosa Parks, to the content of the song.”225
Accordingly, it looked to the song lyrics, specifically, “Ah ha, hush that
fuss. Everybody move to the back of the bus.”226 Although OutKast’s
song was not about Rosa Parks “in a strictly biographical sense,” and
OutKast admitted that they had never intended the song to be about Rosa
Parks, OutKast’s use of her name and the phrase “move to the back of the
bus” could be considered a reference to Rosa Parks.227 Thus, the court
found that the title of the song was not ‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of
the song and precluded summary judgment on OutKast’s First Amendment
defense.228
The relatedness test has been criticized because it was created in response
to a claim under the Lanham Act.229 The right of publicity is broader than
trademark law, and therefore any right of publicity test should have a
broader scope than a trademark law test.230 Additionally, because the
analysis focused entirely on the title of a work, the Rogers concurrence
cautioned that the “unique case” would be an “inappropriate vehicle for
fashioning a general rule.”231 Finally, the relatedness test has been
criticized because it has been applied inconsistently.232 While the Sixth
Circuit used the relatedness test to resolve a right of publicity issue in Parks
v. LaFace Records, just a few months later, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh

220. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002.
221. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
222. Id. at 442.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 461 (“Use of another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . not
ordinarily an infringement [of the right of publicity, unless] the name or likeness is used
solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person.” (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995)).
225. Id. at 442.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 452–53.
228. Id. at 461.
229. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013).
230. Id. (noting that the relatedness test “is a blunt instrument, unfit for widespread
application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two fundamental
protections: the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit from
one’s own identity”).
231. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir. 1989) (Griesa, J., concurring).
232. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 156.
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Publishing Inc., it declared that the relatedness test is not applicable to right
of publicity claims.233
2. The Predominant Purpose Test
Under the predominant purpose test adopted in Doe v. TCI
Cablevision,234 an unauthorized use of an individual’s identity violates the
individual’s right of publicity only if the use is “predominantly
commercial,” while a “predominantly expressive” use of the individual’s
identity does not violate his or her right of publicity.235 Noting that right of
publicity cases focus on whether the use of a person’s identity is
“expressive” or “commercial,”236 the Missouri Supreme Court considered
that the relatedness test and the transformative use test did not give
sufficient thought to the fact that many uses of a person’s identity could
have both expressive and commercial elements.237
Therefore, the court applied the predominant purpose test,238 finding that
it “better addresses the cases where speech is both expressive and
commercial.”239 Under this test, a work that “predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity” violates the individual’s right
of identity even if the work has some expressive components. 240 On the
other hand, a work whose purpose is predominantly expressive should
receive First Amendment protection in a right of publicity claim.241
With this framework, the court analyzed Anthony “Tony” Twist’s right
of publicity claim against Todd McFarlane Productions, Inc.242 Plaintiff,
Tony Twist, was a hockey player who played for the Quebec Nordiques,
and who was known for his “tough-guy ‘enforcer’” persona.243 In 1992,
McFarlane created a comic book that included a “tough-guy ‘enforcer’”
character name Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.244 In 1994, in a response
to fan questions, McFarlane admitted that the comic book character Tony
Twist was the name of a hockey player for the Quebec Nordiques.245

233. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003).
234. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
235. Id. at 374.
236. Id. at 373 (noting that while use of a person’s likeness in news and creative works is
expressive speech, and therefore fully protected, use of a person’s likeness for “purely
commercial purposes” is commercial speech and generally not protected).
237. Id. at 373–74 (noting that the relatedness test and the transformative use test do not
actually balance the right of publicity and First Amendment interests but instead
automatically grant First Amendment protection to works that are expressive and deny
protection to works that are commercial).
238. This test was initially proposed by intellectual property litigator, Mark Lee. See
Mark Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500–01 (2003).
239. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
240. Lee, supra note 233, at 500.
241. Id.
242. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 366.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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The court found that the defendants had used Twist’s identity for
commercial gain, yet there was also an expressive element to the use of his
name “as a metaphorical reference to tough-guy ‘enforcers.’”246
Comparing the commercial and expressive components of the comic book
character, the court found that the use of Twist’s name did not serve as an
“artistic or literary expression,” but instead had become “predominantly a
ploy” to sell merchandise. 247 Thus, Tony Twist’s right of publicity trumped
McFarlane’s free speech rights.248
Jurisdictions outside of Missouri have not adopted the predominant
purpose test.249 Critics note that the test does not balance free speech and
right of publicity values. 250 Instead, the test requires judges to look to
artists’ motivations in creating works.251 This inquiry does not offer an
accurate analysis of the value of the art; artists are often motivated by profit,
yet this does not reduce the expressive value of their works.252
Additionally, the test does not provide guidelines for determining when a
work is “predominantly expressive.”253
3. The Transformative Use Test
Under the transformative use test, a work depicting a celebrity does not
infringe on the celebrity’s right of publicity if it is the artist’s creative
expression rather than a literal depiction of the celebrity. 254 This test was
developed in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,255 where
Comedy III Productions, Inc., the registered owner to a comedy act known
as the Three Stooges, brought suit against Saderup, an artist who
specialized in charcoal drawings of celebrities.256 Saderup’s drawings were
used to create lithographic prints on T-shirts.257 Without obtaining Comedy
III’s permission, Saderup sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing an image of
The Three Stooges. 258
The California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Comedy III, concluding
that Saderup’s works did not receive First Amendment protection because
“they were reproductions rather than original works of art.”259 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of California noted that reproductions are also entitled to
246. Id. at 374.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Tan, supra note 11, at 29. The Third Circuit has called the test “subjective at best,
[and] arbitrary at worst.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013).
250. See Tan, supra note 11, at 29–30; see also Michael S. Kruse, Missouri’s Interfacing
of the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity: Is the “Predominant Purpose” Test
Really That Desirable?, 69 MO. L. REV. 799, 816 (2004).
251. See Kruse, supra note 245, at 815–16.
252. Id.
253. Tan, supra note 11, at 30.
254. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
255. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
256. Id. at 800–01.
257. Id. at 800.
258. Id. at 800–01.
259. Id. at 799.
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First Amendment protection and chose to resolve the issue by analyzing the
works themselves. 260
The court drew on the “fair use” analysis from copyright law and looked
to “the purpose and character of use” of works which threatened one’s right
of publicity.261 The purpose of looking into this fair use factor was to
determine whether a new work is “transformative.”262 Thus, the court held
that the balance between the right of publicity and the First Amendment
turns on “whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression
rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”263 The First Amendment protects
works with transformative elements—that is, works that “add[] something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work]
with new expression, meaning, or message.”264
To determine whether a work is transformative, courts may consider
whether the value of the work derives “primarily from the fame of the
celebrity depicted.”265 If the value of the work comes not from the depicted
celebrity’s fame but rather from “the creativity, skill, and reputation of the
artist,” the work is likely sufficiently transformative.266
Based on the transformative use test, the court concluded that the right of
publicity outweighed Saderup’s First Amendment rights.267 The court
compared Saderup’s works to Andy Warhol’s silkscreens, which depicted
images of Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley. 268 It
observed that while Warhol distorted the celebrities’ images to convey a
“social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself,” Saderup’s goal
was to create “literal, conventional depictions of the Three Stooges so as to
exploit their fame.”269 The court considered that protecting Saderup’s
works would eviscerate the right of publicity entirely because celebrities
would no longer have sole control over the use of their images.270

260. Id.
261. Id. at 808. The court looked to copyright law because both laws are similar in that
they encourage creativity by incentivizing entertainers with personal profit. See Ausness,
supra note 59, at 989.
262. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 808. Transformative elements include parody, factual reporting, fictionalized
portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and subtle social criticism. Id. at 809.
265. Id. at 810.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 799.
268. Id. at 811.
269. Id. But see Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a comic
book featuring “half-worm, half-human” creatures had sufficiently transformed the
plaintiffs’ likeness and, thus, was protected by the First Amendment). In between the
Comedy III and Winter spectrum is Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., in which the California
Court of Appeal found a video game character sufficiently transformed because although the
character was “reminiscent” of the plaintiff, there were significant differences between the
plaintiff’s traits and those of the character. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2006).
270. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811.
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a. Critiques of the Transformative Use Test
Scholars have noted three significant flaws with the transformative use
test. First, the transformative use test stems from the fair use doctrine in
copyright law, which is “murky and unpredictable.”271 Second, the
definition of a “transformative” work is unclear.272 Third, the test places
the judiciary in the position of art critic rather than judge, when deciding
whether a work is transformative.273
Because the transformative use test has created uncertainty in fair use
analysis,274 scholars criticize its expansion to right of publicity cases.275
When applied to copyright cases, the transformative use test furthers the
goal of copyright law, which is to “encourage the production of new
Yet, in the right of publicity context, the
expressive works.”276
transformative use test has the opposite effect by limiting new expressive
creations unless they are “transformative in the right of publicity sense.”277
For example, while Saderup’s drawing in Comedy III deserved copyright
protection because it reflected original creation by depicting the Three
Stooges realistically, it violated the right of publicity.278
Additionally, Comedy III did not create a clear definition of what
constitutes a transformative use.279 The Comedy III court defined
“transformative” use in three distinct ways. A transformative work is one
which: (1) “contribut[es] something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation,”
(2) uses the celebrity’s likeness as only “one of the ‘raw materials’” to
create an original work, and (3) alters the “expression, meaning, or
message” of the celebrity’s images.280 These three definitions can be
difficult to reconcile.281 A work can satisfy the first two definitions without
necessarily altering the “expression, meaning, or message” of the
celebrity’s image. 282 Therefore, it can be difficult to determine what is
271. Dougherty, supra note 20, at 28. The phrase “transformative use” was first used in
fair use cases in copyright law. See supra Part II.B.3. In a 1990 Harvard Law Review
article, Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit first explained that under the “purpose and
character [test]” of the fair use doctrine, a work could be copied so long as that work was
“transformative.” See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990). Just four years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme
Court defined transformative use as “altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message.” 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court emphasized that a “transformative use” is
central for a finding of fair use. Id.
272. See Dougherty, supra note 20, at 29.
273. See id. at 70.
274. Id. at 32; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They
Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251,
254 (1998).
275. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 922; see also Dougherty, supra note 20, at 28.
276. Dougherty, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that the transformative use test requires
works to “incorporate new expression”).
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Volokh, supra note 20, at 916.
280. Id. at 916–17.
281. See id. at 917.
282. Id.
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transformative. 283 As a result, the transformative use test has yielded
inconsistent results. For instance, courts have reached opposing decisions
due to different understandings of what must be “transformed” in order for
a work to pass the transformative use test; it is unclear whether a work is
“transformative” if the celebrity’s image has been transformed or if the
work as a whole has transformative elements. 284 Moreover, an unclear
definition leaves artists confused about what sort of works they can and
cannot create, which in turn may limit the types of art produced.285
Finally, the test allows too much subjectivity in judgment.286 The test
requires judges to act as art critics, which is a “dangerous undertaking” for
which they are unprepared. 287 Critics of the test question “whether society
would benefit from judicial art critics deciding which art adds to societal
commentary and which art does not.”288 When judges are influenced by
their aesthetic preferences in their decisions, there is a risk that they will
shape the art created in the future.289 To guarantee protection of their
artwork, artists may begin shaping their art to “meet the aesthetic
preferences of judges.”290
However, considering that the transformative use test is applied in cases
involving artistic creations, some commentators have noted that subjectivity
is inevitable, and not entirely undesirable.291 Given varying artistic tastes
and preferences, judging artistic creations “objectively” is nearly
impossible. Therefore, “instead of hiding behind a bright line rule with an
illusory promise of objectivity,” the transformative use test acknowledges
the minimal subjectivity inherent in its application.292 Additionally, the
Comedy III court constrained the subjectivity of the transformative use test
283. See id.
284. Compare Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that a
video game with significant creative elements did not pass the transformative use test
because the plaintiff’s image had not been creatively altered), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a work consisting of a collage of
images was transformative even though the plaintiff’s image was a literal representation).
285. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 917–18.
286. See Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, an
Unworkable Decision, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 316 (2004).
287. Pete Singer, The Three Stooges Latest Act: Attempting to Define the Scope of
Protection the First Amendment Provides to Works of Art Depicting Celebrities, Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 313
(2002) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge.”)).
288. Whitman, supra note 148, at 44; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8,
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (No. 01-368), 2001
WL 34116904 (noting the “elitism built into the court’s concept of art that is ‘creative’ or
‘transformative’”).
289. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
248–49 (1998).
290. Id.
291. See Jasmer, supra note 286, at 316.
292. Id. at 317.
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by emphasizing that courts should not be concerned with the quality of the
art at issue when deciding whether it is transformative.293
b. Justifications for the Transformative Use Test
Despite the flaws of the transformative use test, it also has several
justifications. First, the transformative use test provides a uniform
framework for balancing right of publicity interests against First
Amendment interests.294 The framework of the transformative use test
strikes the proper balance between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity by limiting the number of situations in which a celebrity has a
right of publicity claim.295 Works that are artistic expressions rather than
the mere likeness of a celebrity do not threaten the celebrity’s commercial
value. 296 The right of publicity protects individuals’ economic interests in
their identities; therefore determining whether a work is transformative
furthers this right of publicity goal.297 Yet, by restricting right of publicity
claims to “a very narrow universe of expressive works” (non-transformative
works), the transformative use test protects the First Amendment.298
Additionally, the transformative use test allows for flexibility in judicial
decisions.299 The cases that present tension between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity are “unique and fact-intensive” because they
involve artistic creations.300 With the transformative use test, courts can
make “case-by-case determinations on the contribution(s) of authors to the
specific piece of art at issue.”301
4. The Ad-Hoc Balancing Test
In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, the Tenth
Circuit used an ad-hoc balancing test to weigh the plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to freedom of expression against the defendant’s right of
publicity.302 Cardtoons produced parody baseball trading cards portraying
caricatures of major league players.303 As part of its marketing plan,
Cardtoons advertised its trading cards in a May 1993 issue of Sports
293. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809–10.
294. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2013).
295. Jasmer, supra note 286, at 314–15.
296. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions of the
celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional
depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect.”).
297. Id.
298. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163.
299. Id. at 162.
300. Jasmer, supra note 286, at 316.
301. Id.
302. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996).
303. Id. at 962 (noting that 71 out of 130 cards designed and produced by Cardtoons
featured caricatures of baseball players on the front and “humorous commentary about their
careers on the back”).
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Collectors Digest.304 This advertisement caught the attention of the Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), who issued cease and
desist letters to Cardtoons and Champs Marketing, Inc., the printing
company that Cardtoons had hired. 305 In response, Cardtoons filed a suit
for a declaratory judgment that its cards did not violate MLBPA members’
right of publicity.306
The court first addressed Cardtoons’s First Amendment rights, noting
that the parody cards are fully protected because they provide “social
commentary on public figures.”307 The court rejected MLBPA’s contention
that Cardtoons’s speech is less protected because it does not use a
traditional medium of expression, citing numerous cases that established
that the First Amendment also protects nontraditional mediums of
expression.308 The court also rejected MLBPA’s argument that Cardtoons’s
cards are commercial speech, noting that the cards “are not transformed into
commercial speech merely because they are sold for profit.”309
Once the court determined that Cardtoons’s cards deserved full First
Amendment protection, it turned to the crux of the case—whether
Cardtoons’s First Amendment right outweighed MLBPA players’ rights of
publicity.310 First, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the
Lloyd alternative avenues of communication test should be used.311 The
court explained that restrictions on how a speaker may communicate run “a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”312 In this case,
Cardtoons could not have effectively depicted its parody without the use of
player identities.313 Therefore, MLBPA’s attempts to enjoin the parody
went to the content of the speech.314
Instead of applying the Lloyd test, the court directly balanced the
restriction on free speech against the government’s interest in protecting the
right of publicity. 315 This balancing test required two steps: first, the court
analyzed “the importance of Cardtoons’s right to free expression and the
304. Id. at 963.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 964.
307. Id. at 969; see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (noting that the right of publicity does not prohibit “caricature,
parody and satire”).
308. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag
burning) and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1982) (nude dancing)).
309. Id. at 970 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 971.
312. Id.; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that a
“restriction on the location of a speech,” as in Lloyd is “different from a restriction on the
words the speaker may use”).
313. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 971.
314. Id. at 972. Content-based restraints on expression are subject to strict scrutiny,
which means that such restraints are constitutional only if they advance a “compelling
government interest” in the least restrictive way possible. Solantic, L.L.C. v. City of Neptune
Beach, 410 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).
315. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
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consequences of limiting that right,” and second, the court weighed “those
consequences against the effect of infringing on MLBPA’s right of
publicity.”316
Addressing the first step of its analysis, the court explained the value of
parodies in our society. 317 As a social criticism, parodies “expose the
foolish and absurd in society.”318 Furthermore, as a means of selfexpression, parodies allow artists to add new meaning to earlier works.319
Parodies of celebrities are especially valuable because celebrities play an
important role in society.320 Therefore, a parody of a celebrity “does not
merely lampoon the celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value
that the celebrity symbolizes in society.”321 Recognizing the value of
parodies, the court noted that MLBPA’s injunction of Cardtoons would
reduce future celebrity parodies, which impinges on the First Amendment
interests in the dissemination of ideas.322
Next, the court evaluated society’s interest in MLBPA’s publicity
right.323 The court applied the facts of the Cardtoons case to the
justifications for the right of publicity.324 After a thorough analysis of the
economic and noneconomic justifications for the right of publicity, the
court concluded that the effect of limiting MLBPA’s right of publicity was
insignificant. 325
a. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n
Considers the Policy Justifications for the Right of Publicity
The Cardtoons court identified three main policy justifications
supporting the right of publicity.326 First, the right of publicity protects an
individual’s personal investment in their public image and prevents others
from unfairly profiting by appropriating it.327 Second, the right properly
incentivizes persons toward creative effort and achievement, which enriches
society.328 Finally, the right protects consumers by protecting them from
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. Id.; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 32–37 (describing the way in which celebrities
shape individuals’ perceptions of self and society).
321. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 (noting that Cardtoons’ trading cards “comment on the
state of major league baseball by turning images of our sports heroes into modern-day
personifications of avarice.”).
322. Id. at 973 (“The last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is a law that lets public
figures keep people from mocking them.”).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 976.
326. Id. at 973–76.
327. Id. at 975–76; see also Whitman, supra note 148, at 51 (“Courts have recognized
that celebrities cultivate their talents and public persona and are due a right to the
commercial value of their efforts in order to prevent others from ‘free riding’ on their
fame.”).
328. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 178.
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“deception and related marketplace harms.”329 This Note refers to these
arguments as the moral argument, economic argument, and consumer
protection argument, respectively. The following three sections evaluate
the justifications for the right of publicity from the perspective of the
Cardtoons court, as well as from the perspective of right of publicity
scholars.
i. The Moral Argument
The moral argument that a celebrity should alone economically benefit
from his likeness is based upon “visceral impulses of ‘fairness.’”330 This
argument is based on three premises. First, because celebrities have
invested much time and effort into creating their image, they alone should
be able to control the value of that image.331 Second, “no social purpose is
served” by allowing others to free ride off the commercial value of a
celebrity’s image. 332 Finally, the right of publicity prevents emotional
injuries of celebrities who do not wish to have their names linked to any
commercial uses.333
Scholars find that the moral argument is weak.334 Celebrities often do
not create their image alone; many players, such as writers, directors, and
coaches, help ensure a celebrity’s success.335 In addition to relying on the
vision and marketing skills of others to create their image, celebrities draw
“upon a pre-existing body of techniques, tools, and craft knowledge.”336
Moreover, a celebrity’s fame may have more to do with the interests and
needs of their audience than with the celebrity’s accomplishments.337
Similarly, the Cardtoons court did not find the moral argument
persuasive, noting that publicity rights “are meant to protect against the loss
of financial gain, not mental anguish.”338 The Eight Circuit echoed the
Cardtoons reasoning in a similar case involving the right of publicity of
major league baseball players.339 Noting that noneconomic justifications
for the right of publicity are unpersuasive, the Eighth Circuit considered
329. Madow, supra note 9, at 135; see also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975. Such harms
include consumer confusion regarding whether a “celebrity has endorsed a particular good.”
Whitman, supra note 148, at 52 (internal quotations omitted).
330. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 2.1.
331. Madow, supra note 9, at 191; see also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975 (noting that the
right of publicity allows “celebrities to enjoy the fruits of their labors” (citing Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977))).
332. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976 (noting that the right of publicity prevents unjust
enrichment); see also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
333. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
334. See Madow, supra note 9, at 196; see also Whitman, supra note 148, at 53.
335. Whitman, supra note 148, at 53; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 191.
336. Madow, supra note 9, at 196 (“Cultural production is always (and necessarily) a
matter of reworking, re-combining, and redeploying already-existing symbolic forms, sounds
narratives, and images.”).
337. See id. at 189.
338. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
339. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
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that noneconomic interests supported by the moral argument, such as
“protecting natural rights, rewarding celebrity labors, and avoiding
emotional harm,” are better protected by the right to privacy.340
ii. The Economic Argument
The economic argument made in support of the right of publicity was the
basis of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Zacchini.341 The Court explained
that the right of publicity incentivizes actors, artists, and athletes who enrich
society with their talents to spend time and effort developing their talents if
they know they can protect the use of their image. 342
The Cardtoons court explained that the argument that the right of
publicity provides an incentive for creativity had been exaggerated because
celebrities earn a significant income, irrespective of the commercial value
of their identities.343 Celebrities earn a living through their performances as
athletes, actors, singers, and other professionals, and they would continue to
earn a living even without the protections offered by the right of
publicity.344
Noting the distinction between the value of a person’s performance and
the value of his identity, the court criticized the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Zacchini.345 In Zacchini, the plaintiff had complained of the use of his
performance, not the use of his identity.346 The Cardtoons court noted that
the Supreme Court’s reasoning, which was based on an incentives rationale,
would be more convincing in a right of performance case than in a right of
publicity case which involved the use of a person’s identity.347
The court considered the incentives argument to be even less persuasive
in the context of celebrity parodies.348 The reason celebrities would likely
not permit parodies of their image is not because they would not make
money from the parodies but rather because they want to protect themselves
from ridicule. 349 Although the court did not deny that publicity rights

340. Id.
341. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977).
342. Id. at 576.
343. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973 (comparing copyright law, which protects the primary
source of an author’s income with the right of publicity which protects a commercial interest
that is merely a “by-product” of the celebrity’s performance value).
344. Id. at 924 (noting the high compensation of many celebrities and pointing to Jim
Carrey’s $20 million paycheck for one movie). Some commentators have criticized the
courts’ references to celebrities’ paychecks when determining whether there has been a
violation of their right of publicity. See Melissa Desormeaux, When Your Rights Depend on
Your Paycheck: The Scary Way Courts Are Deciding Right of Publicity Cases, 12 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 290 (2009). Most celebrities who bring right of publicity claims
are very well paid, so the suggestion that because of this, celebrities do not have a right of
publicity would leave many celebrity plaintiffs without a remedy for harm suffered. Id.
345. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973.
346. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569.
347. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973.
348. Id. at 974.
349. Id.
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provide some incentives for achievement, it concluded that those incentives
were “reduced or eliminated in the context of celebrity parodies.”350
Next, the court addressed the argument that the right of publicity
“promotes the efficient allocation of resources.”351 According to this
argument, because not everyone can commercially exploit a celebrity’s
image, the value of that image is preserved.352 Thus, the economic value of
an identity is higher when that identity is controlled by a limited number of
people. 353 While the court considered this a valid argument in the context
of advertising, “where repeated use of a celebrity’s likeness to sell products
may eventually diminish its commercial value,” it was not persuaded by its
application to non-advertising uses. 354
iii. The Consumer Protection Argument
A final rationale for the right of publicity is that it protects consumers
When advertisements depict
from “deceptive trade practices.”355
celebrities, there is a risk that consumers will be deceived into thinking that
the celebrity is endorsing the product that is being advertised. 356 As a
result, they may purchase a product that they would not have otherwise
purchased.357 Thus, the right of publicity acts as a “mechanism for
advertising regulation.”358
The Cardtoons court found this argument inapplicable to the right of
publicity because the Lanham Act already addresses consumer deception in
trademark law. 359 Rather than protecting consumers, critics argue that “the
right of publicity grants the celebrity an information monopoly.”360 The
right of publicity focuses on “the celebrity’s interest in controlling and
benefiting from the economic value of his identity” rather than on “the
interest of the consuming public in freedom from deception.”361
b. Examining the Merits of the Balancing Test
Arguably “one of the most significant developments in judging practice
in the twentieth century,” balancing tests have been abundantly used in
American jurisprudence. 362 The balancing test is justified on three grounds:
it is “simple, descriptive, and just.”363 Balancing tests involve three

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 974–75.
See id. at 975.
Id.
Madow, supra note 9, at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 228.
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975.
Whitman, supra note 148, at 54; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 233.
Madow, supra note 9, at 233.
Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 587 (1988).
Id. at 622.
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straightforward steps.364 First, the interests that need to be balanced are
determined; second, the elements of each interest are weighed; and third,
one interest is determined to outweigh the other.365 This sort of analysis
can often be easier than “traditional legal reasoning.”366 Additionally, there
is simplicity in the fact that when a court engages in a balancing test, it
directly states what it is doing. 367 Thus, “the balancing test is a more
accurate description of judging than the description suggested by
[traditional legal reasoning].”368
The simple structure of the balancing test allows judges to consider all of
the elements that may influence a decision.369 Additionally, it allows for
flexibility, which leads to more nuanced judicial decisions not bound by
rigid standards.370 Each time the balancing test is used it is applied to the
facts of the case at hand, so even a balancing test that has been repeated
often provides flexibility.371
Courts have long used a balancing test to weigh society’s interest in free
speech against government interests to restrain speech.372 In American
Communications Ass’n v. Douds,373 the Supreme Court stated that when
faced with conflicting rights, “the duty of the courts is to determine which
of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented.”374 Thus, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,375 the Supreme Court balanced First Amendment interests against
society’s concern with libel. 376 Similarly, in Miller v. California,377 the
Supreme Court weighed the interests of the First Amendment in assuring
free discourse against the societal interest in sexually explicit conduct,
finding that the First Amendment does not protect obscene material.378
The balancing test is “based on an attractive metaphor—the weighing of
interests upon a scale of justice.”379 However, use of a balancing test
means that there is no clear rule or standard by which a speaker can gauge
whether his speech will be protected.380 Although there is no guarantee of
how a rule will be applied to a new circumstance, when there is no rule,

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.
Id.
See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Id. at 399.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 283.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 36–37.
McFadden, supra note 362, at 588.
Id.
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uncertainty is guaranteed. 381 Uncertainty is especially dangerous in the
context of free speech because “it tends to deter all but the most courageous
(not necessarily the most rational) [speech] from entering the market place
of ideas.”382
While the balancing test offers a nuanced analysis of competing interests,
the lack of structure inherent in a balancing test may decrease the
predictability of results.383 Nonetheless, some right of publicity scholars
believe that in balancing the interests of the right of publicity against the
First Amendment, the ad-hoc balancing test “best allows” courts to evaluate
the harms and benefits of the parties involved based on a thorough
consideration of multiple factors.384
C. The Sixth Circuit Combines the Transformative Use Test
and the Ad-Hoc Balancing Test
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the Sixth Circuit balanced the
right of publicity against First Amendment interests by relying on the
Comedy III transformative use test and the Cardtoons ad-hoc balancing
test.385 Plaintiff, ETW Corporation, the licensing agent of professional
golfer Tiger Woods, had the exclusive right to exploit Tiger Woods’s
publicity rights.386 When “America’s sports artist,” Rick Rush created a
painting commemorating Tiger Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters
Tournament, ETW brought suit against Jireh Publishing, the publisher of
artist Rick Rush for violation of Woods’s right of publicity.387 First, to
define the right of publicity, the court referenced the Third Restatement of
Unfair Competition. 388 Next, to balance Woods’s right of publicity against
Rush’s First Amendment interests, the Sixth Circuit relied on two different
tests.
The court looked to the Tenth Circuit’s ad-hoc balancing test used in
Cardtoons.389 In balancing Woods’s interest against free speech restriction,
the court noted that Woods, like most celebrities, makes his income through

381. Id.; see also Emerson, supra note 94, at 913 (noting that the ad-hoc balancing test
casts the court “loose in a vast space, embracing the broadest possible range of issues, to
strike a general balance in the light of its own best judgment.”).
382. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939 (1968); see
also Emerson, supra note 94, at 913 (noting that the uncertainty of the ad-hoc balancing test
“makes it realistically impossible for a court . . . to . . . check the unruly forces that seek to
destroy a system of free expression”).
383. Michael Madow, Personality As Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 349–52 (Peter Yu ed., 2007).
384. Tan, supra note 11, at 44.
385. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
386. Id. at 918.
387. Id. at 918–19.
388. Id. at 930.
389. Id. at 935.
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professional golf, which is an activity unrelated to his right of publicity.390
Thus, the court found that a print depicting Woods would likely not “reduce
the commercial value of his likeness.”391 The court further noted that Rush
had “added a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s
identity.”392 Therefore, permitting Woods’s right of publicity to override
Rush’s freedom of expression would smother Rush’s right to profit from his
creativity.393 Based on this balancing of Rush’s freedom of expression and
Woods’s right of publicity, the court found that “society’s interest in
freedom of artistic expression” outweighed Woods’s right of publicity.394
Next, the court drew on the transformative use test adopted by the
Supreme Court of California in Comedy III. 395 The court compared Rush’s
work with the work of the artist in Comedy III: while the artist in Comedy
III had created “nearly photographic reproduction of the faces of The Three
Stooges,” Rush’s prints combined images to “describe, in artistic form, a
historic event in sports history and to convey a message about the
significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.”396 Therefore, the court
found that Rush’s work was sufficiently transformative to warrant First
Amendment protection.397
Judge Clay’s dissent characterized the majority’s holding as “disjointed”
because the majority referenced the Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition, the Cardtoons test, and the Comedy III test in order to reach
one conclusion. 398 Judge Clay criticized the majority’s analysis as well as
its outcome, finding instead that the court should have applied the Comedy
III transformative use test.399 He considered that the transformative use test
“takes into account all of the competing interests while allowing for a single
well-determined outcome that provides guidance and adds to the
jurisprudence as a whole.”400 Applying the transformative use test to the
facts of the case, Justice Clay found that Rush’s goal had been to create
“literal, conventional depictions of [Tiger Woods] so as to exploit

390. Id. at 938. This was the same consideration weighed by the court in Cardtoons. Id.
at 937; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973
(10th Cir. 1996).
391. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938.
392. Id. Rush’s artistic portrayal of a “historic sporting event” conveyed a message about
the value American culture places on sporting events. Id. at 936.
393. Id. at 938.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“[I]t appears that the majority engages in three
separate analyses, and arrives at three separate holdings, although all of which reach the
same result.”).
399. Id. at 951–52.
400. Id. at 952.
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his . . . fame.”401 Therefore, Judge Clay would have found that Woods’s
right of publicity outweighed Rush’s freedom of expression. 402
Commentators agree with Judge Clay that the majority’s analysis was
flawed. 403 After a thorough discussion on the background of the right of
publicity and how other courts have balanced this right against the First
Amendment, the court’s analysis of the case before it consists of only few
paragraphs.404 Additionally, the majority combined the Lanham Act and
the right of publicity analysis, making it difficult to understand which facts
and law applied to which claims.405
III. A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE TENSION
A modified version of the ETW approach offers a workable standard for
resolving the tension between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity. Although courts have treated the transformative use test and the
ad-hoc balancing test as two separate approaches, 406 the Sixth Circuit’s use
of both tests to determine one issue illustrates that the two tests actually
work in conjunction to create a predictable standard for balancing the First
Amendment against the right of publicity. Rather than engaging in two
separate inquires as the ETW court did, courts should formally incorporate
the transformative use test into the ad-hoc balancing test to create a more
comprehensive standard that reliably protects the competing interests at
stake.
Part III.A outlines the steps a court would take under this proposed test.
Part III.B explains why this proposed test offers a predictable standard for
resolving the still unresolved tension between the First Amendment and the
right of publicity.
A. Applying the Proposed Test
Under this proposed test, a court would begin by identifying the interests
to be balanced, the right of publicity versus the First Amendment. To guide
its analysis of the right of publicity, the court would call upon the
transformative use test. The incorporation of the transformative test at this
point is particularly effective because the extent to which a piece has been
transformed can be determinative of whether the traditional justifications
for recognizing the right of publicity are present.

401. Id. at 959.
402. Id. at 959–60; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 48 (noting that Jireh Publishing should
not have been protected by the First Amendment).
403. See Jasmer, supra note 286, at 324–32; see also Tan, supra note 11, at 47 (noting
that the majority engaged in a “tenuous application” of the transformative use test).
404. See Jasmer, supra note 286, at 326 (“The court painstakingly explained the law in
each area but then failed to apply it as carefully. The decision reads as if the court suddenly
became tired of thinking about the issues and uncomfortably penned a string of conclusions
as fast as possible to get rid of the case.”).
405. Id.
406. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013).
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The purpose of the transformative use test is directly linked to the
economic justification for the right of publicity;407 “transformative” works
that represent the artist’s creative talent rather than a literal depiction of the
celebrity do not offer “good substitutes for conventional depictions of the
celebrity” and, therefore, do not threaten the celebrity’s commercial value
that the right of publicity is meant to protect.408 Therefore, because a
celebrity’s commercial interests are less likely to be directly threatened by
transformative works than non-transformative works, assessing the
transformative nature of a piece is relevant to evaluating the economic
justifications for recognizing a right of publicity. A finding that a work is
transformative would shift the balancing test in favor of the First
Amendment interests, while a finding that a work is not transformative, but
rather a literal depiction of the celebrity, would shift the balancing test in
favor of the right of publicity.
The extent to which a piece is transformative is also helpful in
determining whether moral arguments justify recognizing the right of
publicity in a given case. The right of publicity recognizes that individuals
invest in creating their public images and, therefore, it is only fair to allow
them to own and control the value that they have created.409 Moral
justifications for the right of publicity also disfavor allowing others to
unjustly enrich themselves by capitalizing on the work of the celebrity
whose image they are using.410 However, when a piece is sufficiently
transformative—that is, when a piece reflects the artist’s creativity and
talent—its value comes from the labor of the artist, rather than simply from
the fame of the celebrity depicted.411 Therefore, the artist is not unjustly
enriching himself because his alterations themselves create value
independent of that which comes from the celebrity depicted. Accordingly,
transformative works shift the balancing test in favor of recognizing the
First Amendment interests of the artist as a matter of fairness.
Transformativeness can even inform the consumer protection
justifications for the right of publicity. Proponents argue that the right of
publicity can be used to protect not only the interests of celebrities but also
the interests of consumers who might purchase products that they
incorrectly believe are endorsed by a celebrity.412 However, arguably the
more transformative elements a piece has, the less likely consumers will be
confused into thinking the piece represents an affiliation or approval of the
celebrity it depicts.
Having used the transformative use test to guide its analysis of the right
of publicity, the court would then weigh the interests of the free speech at
407. In fact, one of the questions courts may ask when applying the transformative use
test is whether the work’s value derives primarily from the artist’s creativity or from the
celebrity’s fame. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
408. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001); see also
supra Part II.B.3.b.
409. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 353–55 and accompanying text.
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issue. The greater the value the speech adds to society, the more likely it is
that the First Amendment interests would outweigh the right of publicity
interests.
B. Why the Proposed Test Offers a Workable Standard
The transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test both allow for
flexibility in judicial decisions.413 Nuanced case-by-case analysis is
especially desirable when artistic creations are at issue, such as in right of
publicity cases.414 However, on their own, both tests present flaws that
reduce the predictability of their application.415 The transformative use test
offers an unclear definition of what constitutes a transformative use.416 As
a result, cases applying this test have yielded inconsistent results.417 The
ad-hoc balancing test lacks a framework to guide courts in their analyses.418
As a result, judges can draw on a potentially limitless range of factors that
they believe should be considered when balancing the interests at stake.
By incorporating the transformative use test into the balancing test, the
proposed test reduces outcome uncertainty in two significant ways. First,
requiring an analysis of the transformative elements of a work allows for a
more targeted consideration of the competing interests at stake. Because
the transformative nature of a piece is directly relevant to determining
whether the justifications for recognizing a right of publicity are present, the
incorporation of the transformative use test makes the balancing test more
uniform and, therefore, more predictable. Second, retaining the second part
of the balancing test, which looks beyond the transformative elements of a
work and addresses the value that the expression at issue adds to society,
ensures that the transformative elements of a work alone are not dispositive.
This, in turn, mitigates the danger that the vagueness of the transformative
use test will lead to an unfair result.
Combining the transformative use test and the ad-hoc balancing test into
a single inquiry builds on the strengths of each test while tempering their
weaknesses. Therefore, a single unified test provides judges with the best
approach for determining the line between protecting free speech and
recognizing an individual’s right of publicity.
CONCLUSION
Over thirty years after the Supreme Court noted the tension between the
First Amendment and the right of publicity, the lower courts still lack a
consistent method of resolving the conflict between these two laws. In
order to maintain the right of publicity while protecting the First

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

See supra notes 297, 367–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.3.a; notes 379–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 279–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 380–81 and accompanying text.
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Amendment, it is crucial that the courts adopt a uniform standard for
balancing the right of publicity against the freedom of expression.
The test proposed in this Note, which is based off of the Sixth Circuit’s
approach in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., offers such a standard.
Combining two already established tests benefits from the best elements of
each test, while reducing their limitations. Therefore, courts should adopt
the proposed test because it creates a predictable standard for balancing the
First Amendment against the right of publicity.

